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China’s slowing economic growth and rapid urbanization have made local
government debt ﬁnancing a signiﬁcant issue. This study uses a sample of
China’s provincial government data for the 2006–2012 period to examine the
eﬀect of the disclosure of ﬁnancial information by local governments on their
debt ﬁnancing costs. The results show that ﬁnancial information disclosure is
conducive to public supervision and enhances government credibility, leading
to a decrease in the cost of debt ﬁnancing. Furthermore, increased government
economic intervention increases the strength of the association between ﬁnan-
cial information disclosure and the cost of debt ﬁnancing. Increased govern-
ment audit prevention function weakens the strength of the association
between ﬁnancial information disclosure and the cost of debt ﬁnancing.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, local government debt has increased. Deputy ﬁnance minister Wang Baoan says: ‘‘The con-
tradiction between tardiness of ﬁnancial growth of revenue and strong rigidity of expenditure will further72071),
oject of
oject of
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ment states that the government’s direct liability for repayment of debt increased by 62.44% between 2010 and
June 2013. As the expansion of debt is often accompanied by an increase in ﬁnancial risk, the Third Plenary
Session of the 18th session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has announced that
the relevant departments should establish a reasonable early warning mechanism to control government debt
risk and to enhance management. For example, The State Council on Strengthening the Opinions of the Local
Government Debt Management was issued by the State Council in 2014. However, a government without debt
ﬁnancing is not a government with no risk. Debt risk, to a large extent, is related to the ability to pay oﬀ debt
(Liu, 2014), and blindness about debt ﬁnancing combined with ignorance about the lending rate leads to huge
risks for governments (Luo and She, 2014).
Previous studies of the cost of debt focus on corporate debt, ﬁnancing scale and risk factors, such as
accounting information and debt contracts (Sun et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2008; Deng, 2014), information disclo-
sure and debt ﬁnancing (Hu and Tang, 2007; Lu et al., 2013), control of local government debt scale (Azuma
and Kurihara, 2011), municipal bonds and local government debt risk (Mikesell, 2002; Liu and Zhao, 2005;
Han et al., 2005), government performance and cost of ﬁnancing (Wilson and Howard, 1984). These previous
studies, especially those examining ﬁnancial disclosure, suggest that the cost of debt ﬁnancing is less for local
governments. Therefore, this study uses a sample of urban construction investment bonds1 issued at the
provincial level to explore how ﬁnancial information transparency aﬀects the cost of local government debt
ﬁnancing. The results show that a high degree of government ﬁnancial information disclosure is associated
with a low cost of local government debt ﬁnancing. A higher government intervention index and more eﬀective
government auditing are also associated with a lower cost of local government debt ﬁnancing, although these
factors also weaken the negative relationship between local government ﬁnancial information disclosure and
government debt ﬁnancing costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the institutional background.
The third section presents the theoretical analysis and research hypotheses, and the fourth section presents
the research design. The ﬁfth section presents the empirical testing and results. The ﬁnal section discusses
the results and presents the conclusions.2. Institutional background
Since its 1993 reforms of its ﬁscal and taxation system policy, the Chinese government has allocated more
capital to regional infrastructure construction. However, these reforms have caused some problems at the local
level, such as the mismatch of government ﬁscal power and responsibility, leading to a lack of ﬁnancial
resources. To meet the demands of economic development and political competition, local governments have
ﬁnanced their regional investment and ﬁnancing platforms2 (Mei, 2011) through bank loans and by issuing
Quasi-municipal bonds (also called urban construction investment bonds, hereinafter referred to as
‘‘UCID”).3 Originally, the central government allowed the Shanghai government to issue bonds to raise
money for urban construction in the new Pudong area. In 2005, with the support of state policy, the use of
UCIDs spread rapidly. In 2008, in response to the global subprime mortgage crisis, the central government
implemented the ‘‘four trillion plan” to stimulate economic growth, and this provided further opportunities
for the development of UCIDs. The issuers of UCIDs are regional investment and ﬁnancing platforms
established by local governments and the aim is to raise money. The buyers are mainly institutional investors,
and the money is used to make loan payments, pay for infrastructure construction and provide day-to-day1 These instruments originated in the Shanghai Pudong construction bonds at the beginning of 1992 and have developed relatively
slowly. However, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and the ‘‘four trillion plan” launched by the government stimulated their development. Due to
concerns about the out of control local ﬁnancing behavior, since 2013, the Chinese government has begun macro control of bonds. As
document No. 43 [2014] indicates: ‘‘local government debt is facing full clear screening, issuing bonds is the only way to raise funds for
provincial governments.”
2 According to the 1994 regulations, ‘‘The local government shall not issue bonds.”
3 The local government debt ﬁnancing may also include forms of trust-ﬁnancing, ﬁnance-leasing and BT-ﬁnancing, but they are adopted
at a very low rate, due to the relatively high cost of ﬁnancing.
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assets. From the perspective of credit risk and credit promotion measures, these platforms always use accounts
receivable, the right of land use or third party professional guarantee agencies as pledges or insurance.
The amount of debt accumulated by local governments in China is constantly increasing, and this has
attracted the attention of regulators. In 2010, a number of bad credit events, such as the Sichuan expressway
event, Yunnan province energy investment group restructuring, and Shanghai Shenhong, led to a drop in the
number of UCIDs issued. Subsequently, the government has begun to standardize the management of ﬁnanc-
ing behavior (i.e., Guidelines strengthening regulatory risk of local government ﬁnancing platform loans in 2012
issued by the ‘‘China Banking Regulatory Commission” [CBRC]), which has caused a bank credit squeeze.4
Therefore, local government debt capital is now largely ﬁnanced without bank loans. Given the capital
requirements of managing debt and funding projects under construction, UCIDs are important ﬁnancing
channels and the main source of borrowing to both repay existing debt and create new debt. The state coun-
cil’s 2014 Opinion on strengthening the administration of local government debt states that the practice of local
governments issuing government bonds and encouraging social capital to participate in public urban infras-
tructure projects has certain beneﬁts for business investment and operations. It is likely that UCIDs will con-
tinue to be used, but the traditional UCIDs will be extended by changes such as a PPP subject for public
oﬀering items. According to Wind, the debt-cash of local governments in 2015 is mainly from sales revenue
of land leases by local investment and ﬁnancing platforms, local government fund and bonds replacement,
bank loans, trust funds and other ﬁnancing channels. Therefore, the timely and full disclose of information
about funding sources and capital investment plans helps investors to evaluate UCIDs. As the rating of
government bonds and interest rates is not only determined by accounting numbers, but also by factors such
as the legal environment and information disclosure Wescott (1984), this study discusses the relationship
between government ﬁnancial information disclosure and debt ﬁnancing costs.3. Theoretical analysis and research hypotheses
3.1. Government ﬁnancial information disclosure and the cost of debt ﬁnancing
Information asymmetry theory (Akerlof, 1970) considers the problem of a ‘‘lemon market.” Information
asymmetry between the public and government creates a strong desire for access to information (Chang,
2008). Even internal stakeholders in the government have a strong need for information, which may be greater
even than that of external stakeholders (Zhang et al., 2009; Lu, 2010). Disclosing government ﬁnancial infor-
mation may help the public to understand how public resources are used, reduce the asymmetrical distribution
of information, increase social support (Zhang and Zhang, 2012) and promote the public ﬁduciary responsi-
bilities of governments (Chen and Li, 2003; Huang et al., 2004). It is well-known that government ﬁnancial
transparency is the key to good ﬁnancial management; it helps in the supervision and evaluation of govern-
ment work, improves the operational eﬃciency of governments and reduces the corruption of government
oﬃcials (Xiao and Yan, 2013; Zhou, 2010). Providing the public with accurate government ﬁnancial informa-
tion is an essential part of public supervision; it enhances a government’s credibility, is a cornerstone of
successful government transformation and is a necessary step in the creation of a responsible and service-
oriented government.
Government ﬁnancial information disclosure allows the general public and stakeholders to understand a
government’s macro policy and dynamic guidelines, to evaluate the government’s resource allocation and
to supervise government behavior. More speciﬁcally, government ﬁnancial transparency helps public investors
accurately assess government performance and enhances their investment conﬁdence. As a result, investors
make better investment decisions and this improves the eﬃciency of investment. Furthermore, by reducing
information asymmetry between the public and the local government, transparency improves a government’s
image and credibility, which increases investors’ trust and thus the government’s ability to attract external4 According to statistics, the proportion of government debt balance accounted for by bank loans decreased from 79% at the end of 2010
to 56.5% in June, 2013.
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positive signals to outside investors. This kind of reputation mechanism facilitates social relations and reduces
the perceived risk of breach of contract, which inﬂuences ﬁnancing pricing. As disclosure of government ﬁnan-
cial information increases the credibility of a government, it reduces the amount of ﬁnancing revenues that
investors require, i.e., the cost of government debt ﬁnancing will be lower. Based on the above analysis, this
study makes the following hypothesis.
H1. A higher level of government ﬁnancial information disclosure is associated with a lower cost of local
government debt ﬁnancing.3.2. Government ﬁnancial information disclosure, government interference and the cost of debt ﬁnancing
The structure and period of state debt ﬁnancing are mainly aﬀected by three factors: the legal system,
marketization and government intervention (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003). The
government intervention index (a subindex of GDI) is a variable for measuring the degree of government
intervention in the market. A high score represents a stronger marketization process and less government
intervention (Fan and Wang, 2001; Xia and Chen, 2007). A low score on the index of government intervention
indicates that a company’s debt ﬁnancing period will be longer, and that the debt ﬁnancing cost will be higher
(Sun et al., 2005). Although the ﬁscal decentralization that occurred between 1950 and 1960 mobilized local
governments’ participation in economic development, the imbalance between its ﬁnancial rights and respon-
sibilities aggravates local ﬁnancial distress and forces local governments to interfere in the market, for exam-
ple, by inﬂuencing ﬁnancial institutions’ credit decisions. This in turn aﬀects local government debt ﬁnancing.
This has been called the ‘‘vassal economy” phenomenon (Shen and Dai, 1990), ‘‘tournament of promotion”
behavior (Zhou, 2004) and ‘‘forced marriage” phenomenon (Xiang, 2012).
When a region has a low government intervention index score, the local government has strong control over
the ﬁnancial market and local enterprises and implicitly guarantees listed companies; this compels local state-
owned banks to engage in diﬀerential loans (Jiang and Li, 2006). Due to risk control indicators, state-owned
banks tend to have more restrictive conditions when considering giving loans to non-state enterprises; thus,
the action is not conducive to the overall reduction of funding cost. However, when there is a high degree
of government ﬁnancial information disclosure, it is easier to break the local government administrative inter-
ference phenomenon. As a kind of reputation mechanism, it reduces the cost of local debt ﬁnancing. When the
government intervention index score is high, the level of marketization and rule of law are improved (Zhao,
2013), and this eﬀectively reduces or even puts an end to government administrative personnel abusing their
power over ﬁnancial institutions, enterprises, institutions and investors. It also reduces the cost of communi-
cation between ﬁnancial institutions and government oﬃcials and improves the eﬃciency of investment, thus
reducing the cost of ﬁnancing by local governments’ investment and ﬁnancing platforms. In this scenario,
government intervention may cause a substitution eﬀect on ﬁnancial information disclosure, so that the incre-
mental contribution of information disclosure to lower costs will decrease. Based on the above analysis, this
study makes the following hypothesis:
H2. Government intervention lowers local governments’ debt ﬁnancing costs and weakens the cost-reduction
eﬀect of ﬁnancial information disclosure on debt ﬁnancing.3.3. Government ﬁnancial information disclosure, government audits and the cost of debt ﬁnancing
Government audits are an important part of the national governance mechanism of supervision; they
promote ﬁduciary responsibility, and play an ‘‘immune system” function (Liu, 2012; Liu et al., 2014). Fiscal
transparency is part of a local government’s economic responsibility, underpins the prevention, reveals and
resists functions of government audits. The basic function of auditing is to discover and correct any poten-
tial hazards in an enterprise’s economic activities. An audit is a kind of external supervision mechanism that
can eﬀectively reduce information asymmetry between principals and agents by monitoring the disclosure of
information by all kinds of organizations. A strong government audit increases the possibility that a local
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Liu (2014). Thus, eﬀective audits increase the reliability of accounting information, improve the operational
eﬃciency of a government, protect ﬁnancial funds and reduce risk (Cai et al., 2009; Wei et al., 2010). The
government of a region with greater marketization triggered by a government audit may have a lower debt
ﬁnancing cost (Tang et al., 2012), and a higher quality of audit is favorable for the formation of a good
municipal bond market.
A government audit is a reputation mechanism that maintains the safety of ﬁnancial capital and increases
government accountability. Government audits examine ﬁnancial revenues and expenditures and can improve
the authenticity and reliability of government ﬁnancial information. Therefore, a government audit can reduce
the debt risk of local government and eﬀectively reduce the cost of ﬁnancing. When the government audit
mechanism is not sound, the ﬁnancial information disclosure system is more likely to ﬁnd weaknesses in
the debt ﬁnancing of local government. The ﬁnancial information disclosure system is an alternative to the
government audit that can eﬀectively prevent debt risk, and thus reduce the cost of debt ﬁnancing. However,
as government audits serve a prevention function, their presence can weaken the governance eﬀect and repu-
tation mechanism of local government ﬁnancial information disclosure. The more eﬀectively the government
audit reduces the cost of debt ﬁnancing, the higher its substitution eﬀect on ﬁnancial information disclosure;
thus, eﬀective audits weaken the eﬀect of information disclosure on the cost of ﬁnancing. Based on the above
analysis, this study makes the following hypothesis.
H3. Eﬀective government audits lower local governments’ debt ﬁnancing costs and weaken the ability of local
government ﬁnancial information disclosure to lower debt ﬁnancing costs.4. Research design
4.1. Sample selection and data sources
This study uses a sample of provincial governments (including provinces, autonomous regions and munic-
ipalities directly under the central government) during the 2006–2012 period. The Tibet autonomous region is
excluded because of missing debt data. The UCID debt-related data are from the Wind database. The ﬁscal
transparency data are from the Fiscal transparency in China report (2013) by the Finance and Public Policy
Research Center of Shanghai University. According to the editor’s introduction, the data for 2011 are related
to the data from 2010, so this study uses the 2011 data for 2010 and 2012. The government intervention data
are from a 2011 report China’s marketization index—regional relative progress of marketization by Fan Gang,
Wang Xiaolu and Zhu Hengpeng. The data from 2010 are approximated with data from 2009. The govern-
ment audit data are from the Chinese audit yearbook (2014). The remaining data are from the CSMAR
regional economic database.4.2. Variable deﬁnitions and model speciﬁcation
Building on previous research, this study uses the following regression model:Loanmr or Loanp50r ¼ a0 þ a1FTscoreþ a2Lngdppþ a3GAP2þ a4INV2þ a5IND1þ a6IND2þ e ð1Þ
If a1 is signiﬁcantly negative, H1 is supported, which suggests that government ﬁnancial information
disclosure has a negative eﬀect on debt ﬁnancing cost.Loanmr or Loanp50r ¼ a0 þ a1FTscoreþ a2gdiþ a3FTscore  gdiþ a4Lngdpp þ a5GAP2
þ a6INV2þ a7IND1þ a8IND2þ e ð2Þ
Loanmr or Loanp50r ¼ a0 þ a1FTscoreþ a2ATpreþ a3FTscore ATpreþ a4Lngdppþ a5GAP2
þ a6INV2þ a7IND1þ a8IND2þ e ð3Þ
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signiﬁcantly positive, it suggests that a higher government intervention index score or a more eﬀective govern-
ment audit prevention function reduces the eﬀect of government ﬁnancial information disclosure on the cost of
local government debt ﬁnancing, i.e., H2 and H3 are supported.
In these models, the dependent variable is local government debt ﬁnancing cost. Each year, many provincial
cities issue UCIDs at diﬀerent interest rates. Therefore, this study uses the mean interest rate (Loan_mr) of all
of the UCIDs issued in a year by all provincial governments as a proxy for local government debt ﬁnancing
cost. Given the skewness and kurtosis of bond rates, the median value of all of the debt interest rate values
(Loan_p50r) issued by each province is taken as a proxy variable for local government debt ﬁnancing cost.
The explanatory variables are government ﬁnancial information disclosure (FTscorew), government interven-
tion (GDI) and government audit (ATPre). The study uses the ﬁscal transparency scores for each province in
China, calculated by the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, as proxy variables for the degree of
government ﬁnancial information disclosure. The government and market index (GDI) is used as a proxy
variable for the degree of government intervention in diﬀerent regions. The government prevention index is
represented by the ATPre index. The remaining variables are control variables. All of the variables are
winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels.
The variable deﬁnitions are shown in Table 1.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
The standard deviation, minimum value and maximum value of the interest rates of each region, presented
in Table 2, show there is a large range between regions in the UCID interest rates. The standard deviation for
regional ﬁscal transparency is 9.261, and the minimum and maximum values are 16.920 and 50.410, respec-
tively, illustrating the big diﬀerence among regional ﬁscal transparency. The average score for government
ﬁnancial information disclosure is 26.267 out of 100, illustrating that government ﬁnance information disclo-
sure is generally low in China. There is very little diﬀerence between regions in terms of regional per capita
GDP or ﬁxed assets investment; however, the mean value of the ﬁscal gap is 1.095, with a maximum value
of 2.958, which shows that some regions are experiencing widespread overspending and face capital pressure.
There are also some diﬀerences in regional industry structures.
Fig. 1 illustrates the trend in the annual average value of ﬁscal transparency (FTscore). Clearly, the mech-
anism for local government ﬁnancial information disclosure is improving. Between 2006 and 2012, 31
provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) increased their ﬁscal
information disclosure by nearly 36%, and the average score rose nearly eight points.
Fig. 2 shows the average scores for the ﬁscal transparency variable (FTscore) by province. The maximum
value, 51.64, is nearly three times the minimum value of 15.9, indicating the large diﬀerence among provinces.Table 1
Deﬁnitions of variables.
Variables Symbol Deﬁnitions
Dependent Loan_mr Mean rates of UCIDs issued in a given area
Loan_p50r Median rates of UCIDs issued in a given area
Explanatory FTscore Government ﬁnancial information disclosure (score of ﬁscal transparency)
FTrank Government ﬁnancial information disclosure (national ranking of ﬁscal transparency)
GDI Government intervention index
ATPre Government audit prevention function index
Control Lngdpp Natural logarithm (base e) of per capita GDP
GAP2 (Final accounts of local ﬁscal expenditure  ﬁnal accounts of local ﬁscal revenue)/ﬁnal
accounts of local ﬁscal revenue
INV2 Natural logarithm of investment in ﬁxed assets
IND_1 First industry share of GDP (%)
IND_2 Second industry share of GDP (%)
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Obs. Mean Std. Min. Median Max.
loan mr 172 5.492 1.108 3.479 5.659 7.284
loan p50r 172 5.507 1.116 3.564 5.675 7.200
FTscore 172 26.267 9.261 16.920 22.575 50.410
GDI 172 8.382 1.227 5.910 8.665 9.910
ATPre 164 10.310 1.479 7.542 10.272 12.973
lngdpp 172 10.285 0.518 9.438 10.268 11.238
GAP2 172 1.095 0.776 0.134 1.167 2.958
INV2 172 8.826 0.668 7.405 8.864 9.886
ind 1 172 0.105 0.049 0.009 0.110 0.177
ind 2 172 0.498 0.052 0.385 0.512 0.571
Note: All of the variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% level.
Figure 1. Fiscal transparency over time. Note: The ﬁscal transparency score has been indexed. Due to missing ﬁscal transparency data
from 2010 and 2012, the study substituted 2011 data for those years.
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jiang (34.10) and Hebei (33.78). Of the four big economic zones, the ﬁscal transparency scores in the eastern
provinces are all more than 20, and Fujian has the highest value (51.64), illustrating relatively high
transparency.
5.2. Correlation analysis
The analysis of the correlation coeﬃcients shows that the interest rates of regional urban construction
investment bonds do not strongly correlate with government ﬁnancial information disclosure, but are gener-
ally related to each of the control variables. The analysis of the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients shows that the
degree of correlation, from strongest to weakest, ranges from investment in ﬁxed assets, secondary industry
share of GDP, ﬁscal gap, the proportion of primary industry and per capita GDP. The Spearman correlation
coeﬃcients produce similar results; the strongest correlation is between ﬁxed asset investment and local gov-
ernment debt interest rate. There are some diﬀerences between the two coeﬃcients; compared to the Pearson
coeﬃcient, the Spearman coeﬃcients show a stronger correlation between ﬁscal gap and interest rates than
between the proportion of secondary industry and interest rates, and the correlation between the proportion
of primary industry and interest rates is weaker. Overall, per capita GDP is correlated with government ﬁnan-
cial information disclosure, which illustrates that more open and transparent ﬁnancial disclosure is associated
with developments in the economy. At the same time, per capita GDP has a signiﬁcantly negative correlation
Figure 2. Fiscal transparency by province. Note: Fiscal transparency scores have been indexed. Due to the missing ﬁscal transparency
data from 2010 and 2012, the study substituted 2011 data for those years.
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associated with higher levels of economic development, a smaller ﬁscal gap is related to less pressure on
ﬁnancial capital, and less dependence on a primary industry (see Table 3).Table 3
Correlation analysis.
loan_mr loan_p50r FTscore GDI ATPre lngdpp GAP2 INV2 ind_1 ind_2
loan_mr 1.000 0.977*** 0.033 0.327*** 0.061 0.170** 0.230*** 0.343*** 0.066 0.199***
loan_p50r 0.978*** 1.000 0.030 0.320*** 0.071 0.156** 0.224*** 0.351*** 0.076 0.190**
FTscore 0.088 0.066 1.000 0.157** 0.189** 0.233*** 0.079 0.193** 0.016 0.129*
GDI 0.261*** 0.245*** 0.023 1.000 0.248*** 0.358*** 0.765*** 0.297*** 0.416*** 0.061
ATPre 0.047 0.066 0.093 0.294*** 1.000 0.257*** 0.248*** 0.465*** 0.200*** 0.216***
lngdpp 0.141* 0.139* 0.166** 0.307*** 0.231*** 1.000 0.666*** 0.422*** 0.816*** 0.184**
GAP2 0.155** 0.138* 0.001 0.759*** 0.307*** 0.621*** 1.000 0.299*** 0.762*** 0.094
INV2 0.323*** 0.337*** 0.148* 0.406*** 0.479*** 0.396*** 0.436*** 1.000 0.175** 0.390***
ind_1 0.148* 0.143* 0.135* 0.338*** 0.160** 0.822*** 0.677*** 0.101 1.000 0.273***
ind_2 0.194** 0.189** 0.087 0.070 0.215*** 0.114 0.058 0.360*** 0.108 1.000
Note: The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is lower left; the Spearman correlation coeﬃcient is upper right; The ATPre correlation
coeﬃcient and other variables’ coeﬃcients are the statistical results of 164 observations.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance level.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance level.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance level.
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The regression results with average interest rates, loan_mr, and median loan_p50r, as the dependent
variables are as follows. The coeﬃcient of government ﬁnancial information disclosure (FTscore) is signif-
icantly negative at the 10% level. This supports H1: a higher degree of government ﬁnancial information
disclosure is associated with a lower issuing rate for UCIDs. In other words, government ﬁnancial infor-
mation disclosure reduces the cost of local government debt ﬁnancing. For the control variables, the
correlation coeﬃcient of per capita GDP (lngdpp) is positively signiﬁcant at the 1% level, i.e., regions with
higher per capita GDP issue UCIDs at higher rates. Generally, a region with advanced economic develop-
ment may be more able to develop a bond market and may get through the approval process more easily.
This would suggest that such regions would issue UCIDs at a lower interest rate; the regression results may
show the opposite trend because governments of richer regions may have larger capital demands, and
therefore issue UCIDs at a higher interest rate. The coeﬃcient of the proportion of the primary industry
(ind_1) is also positively signiﬁcant at the 5% level illustrating that the issuing rate of UCID increases with
an increase in the contribution of a primary industry. These results conﬁrm the study’s hypotheses. Regions
with relatively low levels of economic development with a larger proportion of GDP from a primary indus-
try have low ﬁscal revenue, less experience in issuing bonds, and diﬃculty in examining and approving the
issuing of bonds. The coeﬃcient for ﬁscal gap (GAP2) is positively signiﬁcant at the 10% level, indicating
that higher interest rates for issuing bonds are associated with a large ﬁscal gap in some areas. It is not
hard to understand that such areas often need more cash-capital. The proportion of the secondary industry
(ind_2) and investment in ﬁxed assets (INV2) are not signiﬁcantly associated with local government debt
ﬁnancing costs (see Table 4).Table 4
Relationship between government ﬁnancial information disclosure and local government debt
ﬁnancing cost.
(1) (2)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTscore 0.019* 0.022*
(1.70) (1.94)
lngdpp 1.773*** 1.720***
(3.54) (3.41)
GAP2 0.409* 0.394*
(1.98) (1.82)
INV2 0.285 0.334
(1.34) (1.46)
ind_1 15.401** 15.115**
(2.65) (2.57)
ind_2 2.421 2.090
(0.98) (0.82)
_cons 18.022*** 17.619***
(3.84) (3.78)
N 172 172
r2_a 0.302 0.294
F 15.750 16.300
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2; F is from model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
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and the cost of local government debt ﬁnancing
Additional analysis considers the relationship between the government intervention index (GDI) and the
interaction of government ﬁnancial information disclosure and the government intervention index
(FTscore*GDI). The coefﬁcient of the government intervention index (GDI) is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level,
indicating that a higher value of GDI is associated with a lower UCID interest rate. A higher score on the government
intervention index implies that the regional market is advanced, and this will provide a better environment for issuing
bonds and reduce the issuing debt interest rates. The coefﬁcient of government ﬁnancial information disclosure
(FTscore) is also signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, but when considered along with the degree of government
intervention (GDI), the effect of government ﬁnancial information disclosure (FTscore) on the issuing rate of UCIDs
decreases, i.e., government intervention reduces the effectiveness of government ﬁnancial information disclosure on
debt ﬁnancing cost. The interaction term (FTscore*GDI) is signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level. The test results for
the control variables are nearly the same as in the previous test results. Both per capita GDP (lngdpp) and the pro-
portion of primary industry (ind_1) are signiﬁcantly positively related to UCID interest rates at the 1% level. Further-
more, investment in ﬁxed assets (INV2) is signiﬁcantly positively related to UCID interest rates at the 10% level (see
Table 5).5.5. The eﬀect of government audit prevention function on the relationship between government ﬁnancial
information disclosure and the cost of local government debt ﬁnancing
Further analysis examines the relationship between the government audit prevention function index
(ATPre) and the interaction of the government ﬁnancial information disclosure and government auditTable 5
Government ﬁnancial information disclosure and local government debt ﬁnancing cost (I).
(1) (2)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTscore 0.152*** 0.168***
(3.24) (3.17)
GDI 0.755*** 0.803***
(3.01) (3.10)
FTscore*GDI 0.016*** 0.018***
(3.08) (2.87)
lngdpp 1.781*** 1.746***
(3.90) (4.02)
GAP2 0.125 0.156
(0.44) (0.54)
INV2 0.334* 0.378*
(1.79) (2.00)
ind_1 18.708*** 18.722***
(3.65) (3.80)
ind_2 1.211 0.852
(0.56) (0.39)
_cons 11.423** 10.759**
(2.51) (2.36)
N 172 172
r2_a 0.367 0.364
F 9.477 11.003
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2. F is from model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
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index is signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level, indicating that a higher value of ATPre is associated with a lower
UCID interest rate. This supports the above argument that in a sound government audit system, an external
audit plays a supervisory role. A sound external audit reduces the ﬁduciary duties of a local government and
improves the government’s reputation in the eyes of the public. It strengthens the government’s credibility,
and this improved reputation reduces the interest rates for issuing debt. The coeﬃcient of government
ﬁnancial information disclosure (FTscore) is signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level for loan_mr and 1% level
for loan_p50r, nearly the same as in the previous test results. However, when considered together with the
degree of government audit prevention function index (ATPre), government ﬁnancial information disclosure
(FTscore) has a less negative eﬀect on the UCID issuing rates, i.e., a strong government audit prevention
function reduces the eﬀect of government ﬁnancial information disclosure on local government debt
ﬁnancing cost. The interaction term (FTscore*ATPre) is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level. The results
for the control variables are almost the same as above. Both per capita GDP (lngdpp) and the proportion
of primary industry (ind_1) are signiﬁcantly positively related to the UCID interest rates at the 1% and 5%
level respectively. Furthermore, the ﬁscal gap (GAP2) is signiﬁcantly positively related to the UCID interest
rate (see Table 6).5.6. Robustness tests
5.6.1. Alternative indicators of government ﬁnancial information disclosure
In the ﬁrst robustness test, the national rank of a region’s government ﬁnancial information disclosure
(FTrank) is substituted for FTscore. The results show that the national ranking of government ﬁnancialTable 6
Government ﬁnancial information disclosure and local government debt ﬁnancing cost (II).
(1) (2)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTscore 0.101** 0.116***
(2.52) (2.79)
ATPre 0.255** 0.279**
(2.10) (2.15)
FTscore*ATPre 0.008** 0.009**
(2.25) (2.39)
lngdpp 1.905*** 1.865***
(3.57) (3.48)
GAP2 0.431* 0.416*
(1.96) (1.78)
INV2 0.293 0.337
(1.24) (1.36)
ind_1 15.712** 15.690**
(2.51) (2.47)
ind_2 2.079 1.750
(0.73) (0.60)
_cons 16.684*** 16.155***
(3.52) (3.36)
N 164 164
r2_a 0.313 0.307
F 12.273 12.390
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2, F is from model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
Table 7
Robustness test (I).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTrank 0.033*** 0.108 0.051 0.033*** 0.133* 0.069
(3.26) (1.66) (0.85) (3.40) (1.89) (1.12)
GDI 0.112 0.069
(0.82) (0.48)
FTrank*GDI 0.010 0.013
(1.30) (1.57)
ATPre 0.018 0.049
(0.17) (0.51)
FTrank*ATPre 0.002 0.003
(0.32) (0.59)
lngdpp 1.692*** 1.620*** 1.741*** 1.597*** 1.560*** 1.664***
(4.40) (4.58) (4.17) (4.01) (4.58) (3.87)
GAP2 0.260 0.107 0.299 0.248 0.133 0.285
(1.45) (0.43) (1.55) (1.31) (0.53) (1.40)
INV2 0.236 0.329* 0.235 0.291 0.383** 0.288
(1.25) (1.87) (1.15) (1.41) (2.16) (1.32)
ind_1 16.042*** 17.367*** 15.574*** 15.300*** 17.142*** 15.220***
(3.76) (4.65) (3.30) (3.48) (4.69) (3.12)
ind_2 2.238 1.199 1.988 1.910 0.813 1.631
(1.02) (0.59) (0.78) (0.84) (0.40) (0.62)
_cons 17.579*** 15.876*** 18.101*** 16.820*** 15.845*** 17.879***
(4.84) (4.15) (4.17) (4.58) (4.29) (4.10)
N 172 172 164 172 172 164
r2_a 0.339 0.368 0.337 0.326 0.362 0.325
F 27.482 17.187 20.696 29.546 15.834 21.390
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2, F is from model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
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government ﬁnancial information disclosure is related to higher UCID interest rates. The coeﬃcients of
government intervention and government audit are no longer signiﬁcant, but the positive eﬀective of ﬁnancial
information disclosure (FTrank) on bond issuing rates is somewhat weakened (see Table 7).5.6.2. Alternative indicators of investment in ﬁxed assets
In a second robustness test, the natural logarithm of ﬁxed assets investment per person (INV) is substi-
tuted for the natural logarithm of investment in ﬁxed assets (INV2). The results are as follows. (i) In the ﬁrst
regression, there is no signiﬁcant correlation between government ﬁnancial information disclosure and local
debt-ﬁnancing cost. However, when the government intervention variable is added, the relationship between
government ﬁnancial information disclosure and government debt-ﬁnancing cost is signiﬁcantly negative at
the 1% level, suggesting that government intervention changes the eﬀect of ﬁnancial information disclosure
on the debt-ﬁnancial cost of UCID. (ii) The results for the test of the eﬀects of government audits are the
same.
Investment in ﬁxed assets is selected as a control variable because of its strong eﬀect on interest rates. In
particular, as one of the three main driving factors of GNP, investment in ﬁxed assets not only aﬀects the
economic forecasts that shape expectations of the benchmark interest rate in the capital market, but also inﬂu-
ences the demand for investment-related funds, which further aﬀect interest rates (supply–demand relationship
and price of cash in the capital market). However, due to the large diﬀerence between regions in the annual
Table 8
Robustness test (II).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTscore 0.015 0.147*** 0.095*** 0.018 0.163*** 0.109***
(1.36) (3.74) (2.93) (1.53) (3.54) (3.32)
GDI 0.631*** 0.668***
(2.91) (2.92)
FTscore*GDI 0.016*** 0.017***
(3.40) (3.04)
ATPre 0.200** 0.219**
(2.13) (2.10)
FTscore*ATPre 0.008** 0.009***
(2.71) (2.91)
lngdpp 0.030 0.422 0.107 0.139 0.271 0.060
(0.05) (0.82) (0.17) (0.23) (0.54) (0.10)
GAP2 0.059 0.391 0.020 0.126 0.453* 0.082
(0.40) (1.51) (0.13) (0.85) (1.78) (0.52)
INV 1.726*** 1.478*** 1.768*** 1.872*** 1.620*** 1.915***
(4.34) (4.34) (4.25) (4.59) (4.47) (4.51)
ind_1 13.904*** 18.061*** 13.547*** 13.863*** 18.205*** 13.623***
(3.51) (5.07) (3.20) (3.42) (5.39) (3.19)
ind_2 0.457 0.155 0.265 0.064 0.251 0.712
(0.21) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.27)
_cons 12.888*** 9.133** 11.616*** 12.209*** 8.337** 10.792***
(3.28) (2.33) (3.04) (3.09) (2.05) (2.77)
N 172 172 164 172 172 164
r2_a 0.377 0.412 0.397 0.378 0.417 0.402
F 46.953 27.189 40.759 42.557 23.484 33.218
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2, F is from the model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
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may reﬂect the characteristics of data distribution and OLS regressions. It is also possible that the population
aﬀects the interest rate of funds. Therefore, ﬁxed assets investment and the inﬂuence of demographics are
considered together. In Table 8, the investment in ﬁxed assets variable is modiﬁed with population average
processing before being used in the regression. The scale data such as GDP per capita receive the same
treatment.5.6.3. Test results after controlling for the scale and time limit of UCID
To test whether the characteristics of the debt structure aﬀect UCID interest rates, the characteristics
of government debt structure are controlled for. A government debt scale variable (i.e., LnLoan_ta: nat-
ural logarithm of annual total issuance of local bonds) and a time limit of UCID variable (i.e.,
Loan_mt: annual mean value of local bonds’ deadline) are included as structural variables. As shown
in Table 9, when the control variables are introduced into the model, there are no substantive changes
to the results.5.6.4. Test results after controlling for the time eﬀect
When Year dummy variables are added to the robustness test, the results are as follows. (1) When the
government intervention variable is not added, there is no signiﬁcant correlation between government
Table 9
Robustness test (III).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTscore 0.017 0.137*** 0.078* 0.019* 0.151*** 0.091**
(1.55) (2.78) (1.88) (1.80) (2.80) (2.14)
GDI 0.689** 0.731***
(2.75) (2.84)
FTscore*GDI 0.014** 0.016**
(2.73) (2.59)
ATPre 0.202* 0.224*
(1.78) (1.86)
FTscore*ATPre 0.006 0.007*
(1.68) (1.85)
lnloan_ta 0.095 0.127 0.093 0.094 0.127 0.097
(0.92) (1.18) (0.82) (0.94) (1.19) (0.88)
loan_mt 0.072** 0.053** 0.070** 0.076*** 0.056** 0.075**
(2.69) (2.10) (2.42) (2.79) (2.21) (2.54)
lngdpp 1.775*** 1.725*** 1.864*** 1.728*** 1.694*** 1.823***
(3.74) (3.83) (3.68) (3.59) (3.87) (3.56)
GAP2 0.494** 0.048 0.513** 0.487** 0.068 0.504**
(2.29) (0.15) (2.25) (2.21) (0.22) (2.14)
INV2 0.240 0.236 0.270 0.293 0.284 0.316
(0.98) (1.02) (0.93) (1.18) (1.27) (1.11)
ind_1 14.476** 18.112*** 14.429** 14.086** 18.018*** 14.305**
(2.62) (3.51) (2.37) (2.55) (3.71) (2.35)
ind_2 2.128 1.481 1.667 1.734 1.083 1.295
(0.86) (0.68) (0.59) (0.69) (0.50) (0.44)
_cons 18.804*** 12.148** 17.649*** 18.490*** 11.612** 17.196***
(4.27) (2.59) (4.01) (4.24) (2.42) (3.85)
N 172 172 164 172 172 164
r2_a 0.334 0.384 0.343 0.330 0.384 0.341
F 20.563 13.424 19.533 24.663 16.806 24.473
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2, F is from model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
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sidered, the relationship between government ﬁnancial information disclosure and government debt-ﬁnancing
cost is signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level, suggesting that government intervention changes the eﬀect of
ﬁnancial information disclosure on the debt-ﬁnancial cost of UCID. (2) The results for the test of the eﬀects
of government audits are the same (see Table 10).6. Conclusions and discussion
In China’s current social and economic system, the level of ﬁnancial information disclosure by provincial
governments is low. Although overall the degree of information disclosure has been increasing, there is still a
large variation between regions in both information disclosure and the cost of government debt ﬁnancing. The
above analyses show that there is a signiﬁcant and negative relationship between government ﬁnancial infor-
mation disclosure and the cost of local government debt ﬁnancing, i.e., more government ﬁnancial informa-
tion disclosure is associated with lower UCID interest rates. When the government intervention index is used
as a regulating variable, the analyses show that with a high score on the government intervention index (GDI),
the substitution eﬀect of ﬁnancial information disclosure is increased, and so the eﬀect of ﬁscal transparency
Table 10
Robustness test (IV).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
loan_mr loan_p50r
FTscore 0.015 0.096** 0.086** 0.018 0.115** 0.103***
(1.10) (2.41) (2.50) (1.36) (2.56) (3.01)
GDI 0.458** 0.516**
(2.55) (2.69)
FTscore*GDI 0.010** 0.012**
(2.36) (2.31)
ATPre 0.157 0.183
(1.53) (1.69)
FTscore*ATPre 0.007** 0.008***
(2.48) (2.77)
lngdpp 0.360 0.525 0.564 0.321 0.521 0.538
(0.80) (1.28) (1.20) (0.68) (1.33) (1.12)
GAP2 0.140 0.363 0.156 0.202 0.439 0.230
(0.55) (1.16) (0.60) (0.78) (1.38) (0.87)
INV2 0.083 0.018 0.174 0.078 0.024 0.190
(0.38) (0.08) (0.79) (0.34) (0.12) (0.83)
ind_1 9.611* 11.891** 10.820** 9.966* 12.643*** 11.539**
(1.99) (2.60) (2.09) (2.04) (2.93) (2.25)
ind_2 3.468* 2.489 2.860 3.310* 2.271 2.787
(1.99) (1.48) (1.40) (1.85) (1.38) (1.31)
_cons 1.260 0.619 1.855 0.717 1.285 2.710
(0.25) (0.14) (0.35) (0.14) (0.29) (0.49)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 172 172 164 172 172 164
r2_a 0.553 0.572 0.554 0.526 0.549 0.532
F 96.019 108.581 122.927 72.501 90.825 85.105
Note: r2_a is the adjusted R2, F is from the model F.
*** = 1% Signiﬁcance levels.
** = 5% Signiﬁcance levels.
* = 10% Signiﬁcance levels.
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lating variable, the analyses show that as the government audits’ prevention function strengthens, the eﬀect of
ﬁscal transparency on debt ﬁnancing cost weakens and vice versa. The results of the robustness tests, which
replace FTscore with FTrank and then INV2 with INV, are consistent with the initial conclusions. Of course,
this study only examines a few of the many factors that inﬂuence local government debt ﬁnancing. Other
factors need to be examined in subsequent studies. In addition, urban construction investment bonds are used
to examine the cost of government debt; however, they may not reﬂect the whole picture of local government
debt. As the new ‘‘budget law” has implemented strict information disclosure mechanisms and credit evalu-
ation systems for local governments issuing bonds, future research can adopt a more comprehensive
perspective.
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